

Message Text

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EXDIS MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

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TAGS: EFIS, PBOR, UR, NO

SUBJECT: EVENSEN VISIT TO WASHINGTON
BRUSSELS FOR USEC, CINCLANT ALSO FOR POLAD
REFS: (A) OSLO 773; (B) OSLO 490

1. SUMMARY. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VINE RECEIVED
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NORWEGIAN LOS MINISTER JENS EVENSEN FEBRUARY 17 FOR EX-
CHANGE OF VIEWS ON FISHERIES AND STRATEGIC ISSUES CONFRONT-
ING NORWAY IN THE NORTHERN REGION. EVENSEN REVIEWED RECENT
HISTORY OF NORWEGIAN-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON FISHERIES QUES-
TIONS AND INDICATED WHAT HE HOPED NORWAY WOULD ACHIEVE IN
MARCH CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION ON FISHERY PROTECTION
ZONE (FPZ) AROUND SVALBARD. VINE PRESENTED COMPREHENSIVE
US PERCEPTION OF STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE
NORTHERN AREAS INCLUDING OUR VIEWS ON FACTORS MOTIVATING
SOVIET POLICIES. ACTION REQUEST AT PARA 14. END SUMMARY.

2. OPENING THE DISCUSSION, EVENSEN INDICATED HE HAD BEEN VISITING A NUMBER OF EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO EXPLAIN NORWEGIAN POSITION ON FISHERY PROTECTION ZONE (FPZ) AROUND SVALBARD AND FUTURE STEPS NORWAY CONTEMPLATED FOLLOWING NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS IN MOSCOW MARCH 13-18. EVENSEN SAID HE WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO TOUCH BASE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE UNDERTAKING THESE TALKS IN MOSCOW AND PROMISED TO ENSURE THAT USG RECEIVED DETAILED REPORT OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN

DISCUSSIONS.

3. NORWAY'S LOS MINISTER SAID THAT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF THE FPZ WAS THE EARLIER ESTABLISHMENT OF A 200-MILE ECONOMIC ZONE ALONG THE NORWEGIAN COAST, BOTH ACTIONS BEING PROMPTED BY AN URGENT NECESSITY TO PROTECT DEPLETED COD, Haddock, AND CAPELIN STOCKS IN NORTHERN WATERS. FULLY AWARE OF LEGAL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION CONCERNING SVALBARD SHELF, EVENSEN SAID NORWAY WAS CAREFUL TO EMPHASIZE A NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH WHICH PROMPTED SOME REPRESENTATIONS FROM WESTERN NATIONS BUT FORMAL DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS (WHICH EVENSEN CHARACTERIZED AS LEGALLY UNTENABLE) FROM EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES. EVENSEN CONFIDENTIAL

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CONTINUED THAT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATED THREE TYPES OF MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE FPZ ONE OF WHICH, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FPZ ITSELF, WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT. UNDER THE PRESENT FPZ, ALL NATIONS FISHING WITHIN THE ZONE ARE OBLIGED TO REPORT THE AMOUNT AND TYPES OF FISH CAUGHT BUT THE SOVIET UNION HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THIS REQUIREMENT. SECONDLY, NORWAY INTENDS TO ESTABLISH TWO NEW CLOSED FISHERY PROTECTION ZONES, ONE ALONG THE WEST COAST OF SVALBARD AND THE OTHER AROUND BEAR ISLAND. ALTHOUGH THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED TRAWLER-FREE ZONES OF 35-40 NAUTICAL MILES, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO LIMIT THE TRAWLER-FREE AREAS TO 20 MILES INITIALLY. WHETHER OR NOT LONG-LINE FISHING WOULD BE PERMITTED IN THE TRAWLER-FREE ZONES BY NORWEGIAN FISHERMEN IS A QUESTION NOT YET RESOLVED BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT. THE THIRD MEASURE IS TO IMPOSE WITHIN THE RESTRICTED ZONES NEAFC REGULATIONS FOR FISHING GEAR WHICH WOULD AUTOMATICALLY IMPOSE MESH SIZES.

4. NORWAY HOPED TO OBTAIN FOLLOWING SOVIET CONCURRENCE IN THE ORIGINAL FPZ AROUND SVALBARD; TO THE NORTH, A 200-MILE ZONE UP TO THE POLE; IN THE NORTHWEST, A MEDIAN LINE DIVISION BETWEEN GREENLAND AND SVALBARD OR WHATEVER IS AGREED BY NEGOTIATION AS THE DIVIDING LINE; TO THE SOUTHWEST, A 200-MILE LINE WHICH WOULD EMBRACE JAN MAYEN ISLAND; TO THE SOUTH, 200 MILES OR UP TO THE NORWEGIAN 200-MILE COASTAL ECONOMIC ZONE; TO THE EAST, 200 MILES

FROM SPITZBERGEN -- SINCE NOVAYA ZEMLIA IS MORE THAN 400 MILES FROM SPITZBERGEN, EVENSEN HOPES THAT THE SOVIETS WILL AGREE TO EXTEND THEIR ZONE 200 MILES WEST WITH THE WATERS FALLING IN BETWEEN CONSIDERED AS HIGH SEAS; TO THE NORTHWEST, WHERE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN SPITZBERGEN AND FRANZ JOSEF LAND IS LESS THAN 400 MILES, THE NORWEGIANS WOULD HOPE TO SECURE SOVIET AGREEMENT TO AN EQUIDISTANT DIVIDING LINE. THE ISSUE OF DELIMITING THE WATERS BETWEEN FRANZ JOSEF LAND AND SPITZBERGEN IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE CONFIDENTIAL

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RAISED DURING THE FORTHCOMING TALKS IN MOSCOW, ACCORDING TO EVENSEN. THE MINISTER EMPHASIZED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JURISDICTION FOR FISHERIES PURPOSES AND DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND INDICATED HE HOPED TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION TO ADOPT REASONABLE POSITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE FORMER.

5. EVENSEN REPORTED THAT THE SOVIET DEPUTY CHIEF NEGOTIATOR TOLD HIM IF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE LEGITIMACY OF 200-MILE CLAIMS, THAT ALL ZONES WOULD BE CONSIDERED INVALID BY THE SOVIET UNION. EVENSEN BELIEVES THIS WAS A TRIAL BALLOON RATHER THAN A SERIOUS SOVIET POSITION. HE STRESSED THAT NORWAY EXPECTED NO CONCLUSIVE AGREEMENT TO EMERGE FROM THE UPCOMING PRELIMINARY ROUND IN MOSCOW.

6. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY VINE THANKED EVENSEN FOR HIS PRESENTATION BUT OBSERVED THAT, SINCE WE DO NOT FISH IN THE REGION, WE HAVE NO FISHERY INTERESTS TO DEFEND OR OTHER VIEWS TO PROFFER ON THAT SPECIFIC SUBJECT. VINE ADDED THAT WE DO, OF COURSE, HAVE A NUMBER OF VIEWS WHICH WE WISHED TO COMMUNICATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

7. VINE DESCRIBED THE PRESENT NORWEGIAN FPZ AS GENERALLY IN ACCORD WITH OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE SPITZBERGEN TREATY AND NOT, IN OUR VIEW, INCONSISTENT WITH THE RIGHTS OF OTHER TREATY SIGNATORIES. HE NOTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THAT WE WELCOMED THE NORWEGIAN NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH AND BELIEVE THE NORWEGIAN ACTION TO BE LEGALLY CONFIDENTIAL

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FEASIBLE. VINE RECALLED THE US POSITION THAT PARTIES TO THE TREATY WERE BETTER OFF NOT TO ASSERT LEGAL CLAIMS BUT TO MANAGE THE QUESTION OF ACCESS TO SPITZBERGEN SHELF RESOURCES ON A PRAGMATIC BASIS. IF ONE ASSERTED LEGAL CLAIMS AT THIS POINT, VINE SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE

LITTLE CHANCE OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE WESTERN ALLIES AND SUCH A MOVE COULD PRECIPITATE DESTABILIZING DISCUSSIONS. HE NOTED THAT, ALTHOUGH WE RESERVED OUR LEGAL RIGHTS, THIS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN VERY LOW KEY FASHION AND THE UNITED STATES REMAINED MOST ANXIOUS TO SUPPORT THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. VINE ADDED THAT WE HAD DONE CONSIDERABLE LOBBYING ON BEHALF OF NORWAY WITH OUR ALLIES WHICH WAS NOT A CHARITABLE GESTURE BUT SOMETHING OF DIRECT CONCERN TO US INTERESTS IN LIGHT OF THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE NORTH.

8. POINTING OUT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD PAID VERY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE NORTHERN REGION FOR THE LAST 4-5 YEARS, VINE SAID THIS AREA IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE TO THE USSR, NOT FOR REASONS OF FISH BUT BECAUSE BASIC SOVIET STRATEGIC, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY INTERESTS WERE INVOLVED. AS WE ARE NOW IN A PERIOD OF FLUX, WE MUST REMAIN ATTENTIVE TO THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF EVEN THE SMALLEST ACTIONS, CONSIDER OUR ALTERNATIVES VERY CAREFULLY AND ABOVE ALL MOVE CAUTIOUSLY.

9. VINE INDICATED THAT WE WERE DISTURBED OVER EVENSEN'S INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE BILATERALLY IN MOSCOW ON ISSUES OF COMMON ALLIED CONCERN FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A CLOUDY LEGAL SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS VERY SYSTEMATIC IN ITS NORTHERN REGION POLICIES TOWARD THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE, THE SVALBARD SHELF, THE FPZ, GRAY ZONES, FISHERY RESOURCES AND THE SVALBARD LAND AREAS THEMSELVES WHERE THEY HAVE RESISTED NORWAY'S EFFORTS TO PROMULGATE ROUTINE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS. HE CHARACTERIZED SOVIET POLICY AS MONOLITHICALLY A FUNCTION OF SOVIET CONFIDENTIAL

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POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND DESCRIBED THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AS PRESUPPOSING A RIGHT TO JOINT DECISION AND SHARING AUTHORITY WITH NORWAY ON THE ENTIRE RANGE OF NORTHERN ISSUES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON ANY FRONT AND THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY NEW SOVIET CLAIM OUTSIDE OF THEIR TRADITIONAL AREAS. VINE CONTINUED THAT THE SOVIETS, IN OUR VIEW, PREFER A PACKAGE ARRANGEMENT LUMPING ALL ISSUES TOGETHER IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO SOVIET INTERESTS. HE ADDED THAT WE HAVE COMMUNICATED THESE VIEWS TO FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND IN OSLO DURING OUR MOST RECENT ROUND OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS. IN LIGHT OF THIS HARD-NOSED SOVIET ATTITUDE, VINE COUNSELED PATIENCE AND STRONG NORWEGIAN ENFORCEMENT POLICIES.

10. WHEN EVENSEN RESPONDED THAT HE MEANT TO SAY HE WAS GOING TO UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS, NOT NEGOTIATIONS, IN MOSCOW VINE POINTED OUT THAT THE FACT OF NEGOTIATION ON A BILATERAL BASIS WITH THE SOVIET UNION CONCEDED A SPECIAL

RIGHT TO THE USSR SINCE ALL OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES WERE EXCLUDED. HE ADDED THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING OF NORWEGIAN POLICIES IN MOSCOW BUT THE SOVIET POSITION IS DICTATED FROM THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES, NOT THE MINISTRY OF FISHERIES. VINE VOICED SOME DOUBT AS TO THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF EVENSEN'S MISSION TO MOSCOW AND REITERATED THAT SOVIET VIEWS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY NATIONAL INTERESTS, NOT LOGICAL REASONING. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE NORWEGIAN SIDE COULD WELL EXPECT SOVIET REJECTION OF NORWEGIAN ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS OR SANCTIONS AND A RE-NEWED PURSUIT OF THE BILATERAL SOLUTION. AGAIN VINE

STRESSED THAT HE WANTED THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT TO KNOW OF OUR FIRM SUPPORT.

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11. ON THE GRAY ZONE AGREEMENT, EVENSEN CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS STILL REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EXISTENCE OF A DISPUTED BORDER AREA AND REMAINED ADAMANT ON THIS ISSUE DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE GRAY ZONE ACCORD. EVENSEN EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WHATEVER NORWAY MAY HAVE CONCEDED IN THE INTEREST OF FISH, THE SOVIETS NOW ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF A BROADER GRAY ZONE WHICH ENCOMPASSES THE DISPUTED REGION AND AGREED TO AN AREA OF NORWEGIAN JURISDICTION EAST OF THE EQUIDISTANT LINE, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY MUCH SMALLER THAN THE AREA OF SOVIET JURISDICTION WEST OF THE SECTOR LINE. VINE NOTED THAT THE PRACTICAL EFFECT WAS TO EXTEND SOVIET JURISDICTION AND THE DISPUTED AREA FURTHER WESTWARD. ON URGENCY OF REACHING A FISHERY ACCORD IN BARENTS SEA, EVENSEN STATED NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT FORESAW POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS ESCORTING TRAWLERS AND FEARED ARMED INCIDENT WHICH WOULD NOT SERVE NORWEGIAN OR AMERICAN INTERESTS. EVENSEN SAID THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS DUE TO EXPIRE JULY 1 BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE EXTENDED. HE COMMENTED THAT A BOUNDARY SOLUTION BISECTING THE DISPUTED TERRITORY EQUALLY BETWEEN THE SECTOR LINE AND THE EQUIDISTANT LINE WOULD BE A GREAT DIPLOMATIC VICTORY FOR NORWAY BUT HE WAS NOT AT ALL OPTIMISTIC. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD VEHEMENTLY REJECT ANY PROPOSAL TO SUBMIT THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

12. NORWEGIAN STRATEGY, EVENSEN STATED, WAS INDEED TO PRESS NORWEGIAN POSITIONS AND RESIST NARROWLY CONCEIVED, UNREASONABLE SOVIET POWER PLAYS. HE RECALLED THAT THE SOVIET UNION FIRST OPPOSED NORWEGIAN ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 200-MILE COASTAL ECONOMIC ZONE BUT NORWAY, THROUGH PERSISTENT NEGOTIATION, WAS ABLE TO OVERCOME SOVIET OPPOSITION AND GAIN ACCEPTANCE OF THE NORWEGIAN ACTION. SIMILARLY, IN THE FPZ CONSULTATIONS, EVENSEN SAID NORWAY BELIEVES THE BEST POLICY IS TO KEEP THE RUSSIANS TALKING IN HOPE OF

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ULTIMATELY GAINING CONCESSIONS. IN ANY EVENT, NORWAY FEELS THAT WHILE TALKS ARE UNDERWAY, THE RISKS OF ANY ARMED INCIDENT ARE REDUCED.

13. VINE CONCLUDED BY OBSERVING THAT NORWAY SHOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM ADOPTING FIRM POLICIES AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTS A NATION ABLE TO DEFINE AND DEFEND ITS OWN INTERESTS. HE REAFFIRMED THE NEED FOR CANDID, FRANK EXCHANGES AND ASSURED EVENSEN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD MAKE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THESE DELICATE ISSUES. AT THIS POINT, VINE MADE PASSING REFERENCE TO FACT THAT DURING OUR OCTOBER BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN OSLO US

DELEGATION WAS NOT BRIEFED AS THOROUGHLY AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED ON STATUS OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN NEGOTIATION OF GRAY ZONE AGREEMENT.

14. ACTION: REQUEST AMBASSADOR SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND TO ADVISE HIM THAT MINISTER EVENSEN WAS RECEIVED AT A HIGH LEVEL IN THE BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, AT EVENSEN'S REQUEST, TO REVIEW FISHERIES ISSUES AND THE MINISTER'S UPCOMING CONSULTATIONS IN MOSCOW. WE WOULD LIKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO KNOW THAT WE COMMUNICATED OUR VIEWS ON THE STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN REGION AND SUGGEST YOU DRAW SELECTIVELY ON THE ABOVE PARAGRAPHS, HIGHLIGHTING FOLLOWING POINTS OF US POLICY MADE DURING EVENSEN'S VISIT:

(A) CONTINUED STEADFAST SUPPORT FOR NORWAY AND DESIRE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE IN STRENGTHENING NORWAY'S HAND VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD; (B) US CONCERN OVER BILATERAL SOVIET-NORWEGIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON FPZ WHERE QUESTIONS OF NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS OF OTHER SIGNATORIES ARE INVOLVED; (C) SOVIET POLICIES MOTI-
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VATED BY STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS, NOT FISH; (D) DANGER OF SOVIET INTEREST IN PACKAGE DEAL OR CONDOMINIUM APPROACH TO BILATERAL RESOLUTION OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN PROBLEM UNDER CONDITIONS HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO USSR; AND (E) COMPLETE US UNDERSTANDING OF PRESENT NORWEGIAN NON-DISCRIMINATORY FPZ AROUND SVALBARD.

15. PRESENT AT MEETING WERE: NORWEGIAN SIDE - MINISTER EVENSEN, AMBASSADOR VINDENES, AMBASSADOR SOMMERFELT AND MR. FOSTERVOLL OF EVENSEN'S LOS STAFF; US SIDE - VINE, FUNSETH AND DONCHI. VANCE

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